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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Morris v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey'
(decided January 10, 2002)
Robert Morris, a Port Authority police officer, held a
"leadership position" with the Port Authority Benevolent
Association (hereinafter "the PBA") since 1997. The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey (hereinafter "Port
Authority") is a municipal corporation that operates Kennedy
International Airport (hereinafter "Kennedy Airport").3 The Port
Authority assigns lockers at Kennedy Airport to Port Authority
police officers who are stationed full time at Kennedy Airport
Command.4 The PBA initiated this action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief enjoining the Port Authority from conducting
random searches of the police officers' lockers, alleging that such
searches were unreasonable in light of the safeguards provided in
the Search and Seizure Clause of both the Federal5 and New York
State6 Constitutions.7 The supreme court found that the searches at
issue did not violate the officers' constitutional rights, and thus the
'290 A.D.2d 22, 736 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1st Dep't 2002).
2 Id. at 23, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 325. The PBA is a corporation that represents all
Port Authority Police officers. Id.3 id.
4 Id. The lockers are provided to the officers to store their civilian clothing
and uniforms, various personal items, and two keys are issued with each locker.
Id. The Port Authority maintains one key to each locker and a master key which
opens all the lockers. Id. The parties are aware that the keys retained by the
Port Authority had previously been used when police officers could not locate
their own keys, or in extreme circumstances, such as the death of a police
officer. Id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.., but upon probable cause ....
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.., but upon
probable cause .... "
7 Morris, 290 A.D.2d at 25, 736 N.Y.S. 2d at 326.
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PBA failed to establish their likelihood of success on the merits,
which resulted in the denial of injunctive relief.
8
On appeal, the primary issue was whether the police
officers had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. The
Appellate Division, First Department also denied injunctive relief
and affirmed the motion court's finding that the officers failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. 10 Despite this
finding, the court discussed the existence of disputed factual
issues, including whether the searches conducted by the Port
Authority were reasonable. Additionally, the court also addressed
the reasonableness of the scope and level of the intrusions in view
of the police officers' status as being employees of the
government."1 Although the court recognized that the officers had
a cause of action for their constitutional claims, the court declined
to rule on the ultimate merits of those assertions.'
2
The events that led to the searches in dispute began in
October 1999. The Port Authority Police Department, (hereinafter
"PAPD") discovered a shortage of radios at Kennedy Airport.'
3
The police officers, at the end of their tours, were storing the radios
in their lockers rather then returning them. 14 The PBA allegedly
expressed concern about the shortage of radios. In response to
' Id. at 25, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 326 (citing Grant Co. v. Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496,
515, 420 N.E.2d 953, 962, 438 N.Y.S.2d 761, 770 (1981)). In order for a party
to obtain injunctive relief, three requirements must be met: (1) the likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury absent granting the preliminary
injunction; and (3) after balancing of the equities in the case, the balance tips in
favor of the plaintiff. Grant Co., 52 N.Y.2d at 517, 420 N.E.2d at 963, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 771.
9 Morris, 290 A.D.2d at 23, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
'0 Id. at 28, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
11 Id.
12 Id.
"3 Id. at 24, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 326. Police officers who tour the command
building at Kennedy Airport are required to carry two-way radios for public-
safety reasons, which include the officers' ability to summon medical assistance
or back-up, and in event of an aviation disaster, to coordinate crash, fire and
rescue functions through police command. Id. The Memorandum Agreement,
which governs the conditions of employment for the police officers, specifies
that Kennedy Airport is to have 125 radios available. Id.
4 Morris, 290 A.D.2d at 24, 736 N.Y.S. 2d at 326. It is important to note that
this discovery followed a directive that was issued the month prior, requiring all
police officers to turn in their radios to command after their tours. Id.
320 [Vol 19
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these concerns, an Inspector in the PAPD warned the police
officers on a number of occasions that steps would be taken if the
radios were not returned, including searches of the officers'
lockers. 15  Subsequently, the PAPD opened and searched
approximately fifty lockers, in the presence of PBA delegates who
were ordered to be present during the search. 16  The search
revealed two radios, which led to disciplinary charges being filed
against those officers.' 7
On appeal, the police officers challenged the trial court's
denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Port Authority from conducting any additional searches of the
police officers' lockers. 18  The police officers argued that such
searches constituted a violation of the police officers'
constitutional rights.19 The officers further argued that the locker
searches were highly intrusive, that the Port Authority acted on
mere suspicion, and that the searches were not only visual, but
involved the moving and inspection of personal property.20 In
addressing the constitutional issues, the court required that in order
to obtain a preliminary injunction, the police officers had to
demonstrate to the court the likelihood of success on the merits;
15 Id.
16 id.
17 Id. After this search, the Inspector issued a memorandum advising all
police officers in the Kennedy Airport Command that the shortage of radios was
due to the fact that the officers were storing them in their lockers and, as a result,
periodical searches would continue until all the radios were accounted for. Id. at
24, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 326. However, approximately 50 radios were turned in
following a short time after the initial search and despite an additional search
that followed two weeks later, no further radios were discovered. As it turns
out, the Inspector later noted that not all 125 radios were available for use on
every tour because "some [were] permanently assigned to fire trucks and
particular police officers such as fire marshals, abandoned car detail and motor
vehicle inspections." Furthermore, the Inspector failed to provide any numerical
data in regard to how many of the 125 radios were unavailable or out for repair
on average at any given time or as to the number of radios "permanently
assigned." Id. at 25, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
"S Id. at 24, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
"9Morris, 290 A.D.2d. at 25, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
20 Id. at 27, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 328. The officers further suggested that a less
intrusive way to manage the radios would have been to set up a system where
each officer, as he/she left the command building for a tour, signed a radio out,
and then back in, when finished with the tour. Id.
2003
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irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; and that a
balancing of the equities lies in their favor.2 1 In this situation, the
court determined injunctive relief was properly denied because the
officers failed to satisfy the first prong of these requirements.
22
The First Department then examined the constitutional
claims asserted by the officers. The court noted that the safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures is designed to protect
the personal privacy and dignity of citizens against unjustifiable
invasions by the state. 23 Additionally, the court pointed out that
this protection extends to unreasonable searches conducted by the
government, even in situations where the government acts as an
employer.24
The relevant parts of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the New York State Constitution Article I
Section 12 are identical. Both provisions provide that the "right of
the people to be secure in their persons.., against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ,25 In addition to
using identical language, both provisions fail to describe what
constitutes an "unreasonable" search of a government employee.
This is precisely the issue that the United States Supreme Court
confronted in O 'Connor v. Ortega.
26
In O'Connor, the United States Supreme Court discussed
the federal standard for determining whether a search is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment in the government employee
context. 27 The Supreme Court held that in cases of searches
conducted by a public employer, "[there must be a balancing] of
the invasion of the employee's legitimate expectations of privacy
against the government's need for supervision, control and the
efficient operation of the workplace., 28 The Court further held that
21 Id. at 26, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 327 (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso, 75 N.Y.2d
860, 862, 552 N.E.2d 166, 167, 552 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (1990)).
22 Id. at 27, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
23 Id. (citing Matter of Caruso v. Ward, 83 N.Y.2d 367, 371, 632 N.E.2d 1251,
1253, 610 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1994)).
24 Morris, 290 A.D.2d at 27, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 328 (citing Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
26 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
27 Id. at 725-26.
21 id. at 719-20.
[Vol 19
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a public employer may have "special needs" which will allow it to
dispense with probable cause and warrant requirements when
conducting workplace searches for, "legitimate, work-related, non-
investigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related
misconduct."
29
In O'Connor, a doctor in a state hospital was suspected of
indecent practices in his management of the hospital's residency
program. While on paid administrative leave during an
investigation of the various charges of wrongdoing, hospital
personnel entered the doctor's office and repeatedly searched it.
31
The doctor commenced an action against the hospital
administration, alleging that the warrantless search of his office
violated the Fourth Amendment. 32  On cross-motions, summary
judgment was entered for the hospital, however the circuit court
reversed and ordered partial summary judgment for the doctor on
the issue of liability.33 The United States Supreme Court affirmed
in part and reversed in part, ruling that neither party was entitled to
29 Id. at 724-25. The court further noted that, "[where] a careful balancing of
governmental and private interests strongly suggests that the public interest is
best served by the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops
short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard." Id. at
722-23 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
30 Id. at 712. The particular concerns of the hospital involved the doctor's
acquisition of a computer for use in the residency program. Id. Officials
believed that the computer had been financed by the possibly coerced
contributions of residents, even though the doctor contended that it was donated.
Id. Additionally, hospital officials were concerned with charges that the doctor
sexually harassed two female hospital employees, and had taken inappropriate
disciplinary action against a resident. Id.
31 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 713. The reason for the search of the doctor's office
is unclear. Hospital administration claimed that the search was conducted to
secure state property. Id. The doctor contends that the purpose of the search
was to secure evidence to use against him in administrative disciplinary
proceedings. Id. During the search, several items were seized from the doctor's
desk and file cabinets, including a card, photograph and book of poetry sent to
the doctor by a former resident. Id. These items were all used later in a
proceeding before the board to impeach the credibility of the former resident,
who testified on the doctor's behalf. Id. Other items were seized including
billing documentation of one of the doctor's private patient's under a Medicaid
program. Id.
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summary judgment. 34 The majority found that the doctor had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office; subject to Fourth
Amendment protection.35 Additionally, the Court found that there
was a genuine issue as to the reasonableness of the inception and
scope of the search, therefore barring summary judgment. 3' The
Supreme Court declined to rule on the issue of whether the search
of the doctor's office and seizure of his belongings was proper.
Rather, the Court articulated the standard of reasonableness for the
district court to adhere to when making its determination of
whether the search was reasonable.
37
It is clear from reviewing the First Department's decision
in Morris that it adopted the identical standard for testing the
reasonableness of a search of a government employee as outlined
by the Supreme Court in the O'Connor case. The First Department
concluded that a public employer's intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of public employees for
non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
investigations of work-related misconduct, "should be judged by
the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. 38
Furthermore, under this standard, "both the inception and the scope
of the intrusion must be reasonable." 39 The court further stated
that a search is justified at its inception when there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that a search will reveal evidence that the
employee is guilty of some work-related misconduct, or that the
search is necessary for a non-investigatory, work-related purpose.4 °
Moreover, the court deemed a search permissible in scope when
14 Id. at 727.
31 id. at 718-19.
36 O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 728.
37 Id. at 726. The standard of reasonableness is to be judged under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard both the inception and scope
of the intrusion must be reasonable: "Determining the reasonableness of any
search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider 'whether
the.., action was justified at its inception,' second, one must determine whether
the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Id. (quoting
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 809 (1984)).
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"the means adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and are not excessively intrusive given the nature of the
misconduct.
' 4t
After examining the reasonableness standard set forth in
O'Connor, the court examined how the New York Courts have
determined whether a search is reasonable. In Matter of Caruso v.
Ward,42 the New York Court of Appeals held that where the
employees in question are police officers, their special status
becomes a factor in determining reasonableness because, "it is
within the State's power to regulate and control the conduct of its
police officers even when the conduct involves the exercise of a
constitutionally protected right. 4 3 The court further held that, "the
privacy expectations of police officers must be regarded as even
further diminished by virtue of their membership in a paramilitary
force, the integrity of which is a recognized and important State
concern."
44
In briefly highlighting the constitutional assertions in
Caruso, the First Department gave credence to the court's finding
in Ward. The Morris court emphasized that the status of the police
officers was to be an integral part in determining reasonableness of
the searches at issue because of the diminished expectation of
privacy, as well as the importance of maintaining the integrity of
the police force in the midst of "turbulent times," when reliable
communication is crucial.45
In conclusion, it is clear that the relevant parts of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New York
State Constitution Article I § 12 are identical. Both provisions
provide that the right of the people to be secure in their persons...
41 id.
42 72 N.Y.2d 432, 530 N.E.2d 850, 534 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1988).
43 Id. at 439, 530 N.E.2d at 853, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 143 (citing Matter of
Morrisette v. Dilworth, 59 N.Y.2d 449, 452 N.E.2d 1222, 465 N.Y.S.2d 894
(1983)).
"Id. at 429, 530 N.E.2d at 853, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 439; see also Morrisette, 59
N.Y.2d at 452, 452 N.E.2d at 1223, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 895 (holding that it is
within the State's power to regulate conduct of its police officers even when that
conduct involves the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, and further
noted that the state has a legitimate concern and interest in maintaining the
independence and integrity of the police force).
41 Morris, 290 A.D.2d at 28, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
2003 325
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against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... ,,46 In addition to having identical wording, both
provisions are unclear as to what constitutes an "unreasonable"
search of a government employee. After the decision in Morris v.
Port Authority of N.Y and NJ,4 7 it is apparent that federal and
state courts apply the same balancing test when determining
whether a search of a government employee is reasonable under
the safeguards provided in both the Federal and State Search and
Seizure Clauses. The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Ortega,48 is not violated by a
search of a government employee, so long as the search is
reasonable at the time of the search's inception and that the scope
of the search is not overly intrusive of the employee's legitimate
expectations of privacy. 49 In applying the balancing test, the Court
established that probable cause and warrant requirements may be
dispensed with due to the fact that public employers have special
needs, provided that the search is based on a reasonable suspicion
that it will reveal evidence of employee misconduct. 5° In Morris,
the Appellate Division adopted the balancing test described by the
United States Supreme Court. Consequently, in New York,
probable cause and warrant requirements may be dispensed with if
a public employer has a reasonable suspicion that a search will
reveal evidence of employee misconduct. However, the court must
balance the reasonableness of the scope of the search at its




46 See supra notes 5-6.
4' 290 A.D.2d 22, 736 N.Y.2d 324 (1st Dep't 2002).
4' 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
491d. at 719-20
50 id.
s' Morris, 290 A.D.2d at 28, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
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